On Sovereignty, Diplomatic Authority, and the Conditions of Peace An aggressor state may interpret the state it attacks as an instrument of rival powers, discounting that state’s own assessment of its security and political future. Within this interpretation, international mediation…
On Accountability, Mediation, and the Limits of Institutional Cooperation The contemporary international order contains both institutional cooperation and strategic rivalry. NATO members use a formal alliance to coordinate policy and collective defence, demonstrating how institutions can sustain cooperation among states.…
On Sovereignty, Consent, and the Rule of Law in Donetsk and Luhansk If sovereignty and territorial integrity lie at the centre of the war, could an agreed settlement create independent, self-governing entities in Donetsk and Luhansk, outside the jurisdiction of…
On Military Aid, Sovereignty, and the Conditions for a Durable Ceasefire What can outside states change in a war they do not enter directly? Their assistance can affect how long a country can defend itself, what losses it can withstand,…
On Ceasefire Monitoring, Criminal Accountability, and the Choice to Enter a War If Ukraine and Russia agree to a renewed ceasefire, an international military presence may be possible, but it would not follow automatically. The parties would first need to…
On the Security Council, Ceasefire Terms, and the Distance Between Appeal and Agreement The international community has repeatedly called for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine and for a peace consistent with the UN Charter. Yet a call for…
What Minsk and Dayton reveal about monitoring, military guarantees, and the distance between stopping a war and securing peace A ceasefire can be watched without being kept. Monitors may record where fighting resumes, identify patterns of violation, and make denial…
